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CRIMINAL APPEALS: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE
CHAD M. OLDFATHER*
MICHAEL M. O’HEAR**
This issue of the Marquette Law Review presents materials from the
Marquette University Law School conference, ―Criminal Appeals: Past,
Present, and Future,‖ which was held at the Law School on June 15–16, 2009.
The conference brought together leading criminal law and judicial process
scholars, as well as a panel of current and former state high court judges and
justices, to examine enduring and emerging issues relating to the exercise of
the appellate function in criminal cases.
Two factors provided the impetus for the conference. The first is the
sheer timeliness of the topic. The past decade has witnessed the emergence of
widespread concern over the fairness and reliability of the American criminal
justice system. The ascendance of DNA evidence, and the resulting wave of
exonerations, has demonstrated the fallibility of the criminal trial process to
an extent previously only imaginable. This suggests the possibility of a
greater role for appellate courts in policing the accuracy of trials. At the same
time, efforts in many jurisdictions to guide and constrain the sentencing
discretion of trial court judges have already resulted in new responsibilities
for appellate courts to review the appropriateness of sentences.
The second impetus for the conference was our sense that there has been a
relative lack of scholarly attention paid to the institutional role of appellate
courts in the criminal context. Most of the scholarship concerning the
functions of appellate courts, and indeed relating to the judicial role more
generally, focuses on the civil system. Yet there are many reasons to believe
that the lessons do not transfer from one context to another. Criminal law is
different. As Roscoe Pound put the matter seventy years ago:
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If one looked at the matter with no knowledge of its history
and as something to be established de novo on the basis of
modern conceptions of social control, it would seem that
where life or liberty is at stake, as in a criminal prosecution, a
rational re-examination of the whole case after trial, at least at
the instance of a convicted accused, to be made by a tribunal
insuring the best judicial power in the jurisdiction, in order to
insure that justice has been done, would be a matter of
course.1
Of course, Pound’s vision has never held sway. But it serves to underscore
the point that the dynamics of criminal cases differ greatly from their civil
counterparts.
At the margins, perhaps, the line distinguishing criminal from civil may
be hard to locate. 2 But the core criminal case pits an individual, whose liberty
and perhaps life is on the line, against the resources of the state. The sides are
not evenly matched either in terms of resources (in the aggregate, and in most
cases, the state has more) or the procedural rules that govern (the government
bears a high burden of proof, and defendants enjoy the protection of
constitutional rights that apply only to them). And while the average criminal
defendant’s goal is simply to prevail, the prosecutor represents the people, and
has as her goal not merely winning, but rather ―doing justice‖ in some larger
sense. These features render criminal litigation quite distinct from the typical
private law dispute, which generally involves a bilateral dispute over money
between parties that are, at least in terms of the rules that govern resolution of
their dispute, relatively evenly matched. 3 It also differs from public law
litigation, which often has direct, future implications for non-parties to the
dispute that may differ in scope and in kind from the implications that
criminal litigation often has for crime victims. 4
The differences between the two systems extend into the appellate sphere,
and manifest themselves both doctrinally and institutionally. Appeals in
criminal cases are asymmetrically available; a convicted defendant can always
1. Roscoe Pound, Introduction, in LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 3
(1939).
2. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1–5 (5th ed.
2009).
3. The classic depiction of this model of adjudication is Lon Fuller’s. See Lon L. Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
4. For the classic statements of the public law model, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). For a discussion of the
relationship between the involvement of victims in the criminal justice system and the civil–criminal
distinction, see Michael M. O’Hear & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Dispute Resolution in Criminal
Law, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2007).
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appeal, while the government’s ability to appeal is quite limited. 5 In addition,
the incentives facing a criminal defendant differ considerably from those
facing the parties to a civil suit. For a host of reasons—among them the fact
that he is likely incarcerated, faces the prospect of living the remainder of his
life with a criminal conviction, and likely has access to free representation—a
criminal defendant has little to lose and much to gain from an appeal, and
consequently is apt to take one even in a case where he is unlikely to be
successful.
The institutional setting differs in other ways. Because criminal appeals
often involve specialized appellate lawyers on both the prosecution and
defense sides, the process involves repeat players to a much greater degree
than is true of civil litigation. This creates an opportunity for strategic
lawyering designed to encourage courts to adopt favorable legal standards. 6 It
also raises ethical issues for defense lawyers in particular. They must, on the
one hand, contend with the situation of the client who they have concluded
does not have a meritorious appeal, which raises the question of when, if ever,
an Anders brief is appropriate.7 Less obviously, the repeat-playing defense
lawyer must also be alert to the possibility that she will argue more vigorously
on behalf of some clients than others. A former colleague told one of us of a
conversation he had with an appellate judge (in a social setting), in which the
judge mused on how helpful it would be if the colleague could somehow
signify the cases in which he had a ―real‖ issue. Of course, they both knew
that this would be improper. But there remains a danger that an appellate
defender will convey the impression that this time she really means it.
Criminal litigation remains predominantly a creature of state court systems.
This, too, presents a dynamic that differs from that in civil cases. As recent
high-profile judicial election campaigns suggest, criminal cases often provide
good fodder for those seeking to challenge a sitting judge. 8 We might
accordingly be concerned that issues related to criminal law play a relatively
large role in initial judicial selection, and that the potential consequences at the
ballot box of a ruling in a criminal case might affect the manner in which courts
5. See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Government Appeals in Criminal Cases: The Myth of
Asymmetry, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
6. Andrew Hessick discusses the government’s ability to do this below. See Andrew Hessick,
The Impact of Government Appellate Strategies on the Development of Criminal Law, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 477 (2009). On the defense side, lawyers might choose, for example, to advance arguments for
changes in the law in cases involving less serious crimes in the hopes that the perceived costs of a
change and the perceived political consequences of a defendant-favorable ruling would be less.
7. For a discussion of no-merits briefs, see Randall L. Hodgkinson, No-Merits Briefs
Undermine the Adversary Process, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 55 (2001). See also DANIEL J.
MEADOR, THOMAS E. BAKER & JOAN E. STEINMAN, APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES,
FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 682–700 (2d ed. 2006).
8. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 644 (2009).
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handle criminal appeals.9 A related concern arises from the fact that criminal
cases involve state courts in the business of applying federal constitutional law
on a regular basis. Given that the Supreme Court is largely out of the business
of error correction, it seems a legitimate concern that federal constitutional
rights might be underenforced in state courts.
The differences between the two systems are likewise manifest in more
narrow, doctrinal senses. The concepts of ―structural error‖ and ―plain error‖
appear primarily, if not exclusively, in criminal appeals. Both involve
departures from core norms of the appellate process.10 Recognition of
structural error places an appellate court in the position of denying any
competence to assess the effects of an error on the judgment. The
acknowledgment of plain error involves a departure from the fundamentally
adversarial nature of our legal system in that it requires the court to recognize
an error that was not raised in the trial court (while at the same time
concluding, in effect, that the error was so obvious no one could have missed
it). The Anders brief likewise pulls the court out of the reactive role that it
normally occupies, requiring it to review the record as an advocate for the
defendant, looking for colorable claims of error.11
The implications of these differences for the nature of the judicial role and
the design of judicial institutions remain largely unexplored. The criminal
justice system necessarily (and properly) entails a certain solicitude toward
criminal defendants, and consequently requires courts at both the trial and
appellate levels to step outside the passive, neutral role that remains as an
ideal in civil cases. The precise manner in which courts in criminal appeals
(and criminal cases more generally) are called on to do so differs from the
manner in which courts depart from the traditional role in public law and
other sorts of cases that deviate from the typical bilateral private law dispute.
It may be, then, that as a general matter the role of the judge in criminal law
litigation is undertheorized.
***
The conference took place over two days, and included six panels as well
as a roundtable discussion of five current and former state supreme court
9. But see Aman L. McLeod, A Comparison of the Criminal Appellate Decisions of Appointed
State Supreme Courts: Insights, Questions, and Implications for Judicial Independence,
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 356 (2007) (reporting the results of an empirical study that suggest ―that
courts whose members were selected with the use of a merit selection commission decided a higher
percentage of criminal cases in favor of the state than did courts chosen without the use of
commissions‖).
10. See MEADOR, BAKER & STEINMAN, supra note 7, at 210; Steven M. Shepard, Note, The
Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Error, 117 YALE L.J. 1180 (2008).
11. See James E. Duggan & Andrew W. Moeller, Make Way for the ABA: Smith v. Robbins
Clears a Path for Anders Alternatives, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 65 (2001).
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justices. 12 The first panel was devoted to historical perspectives. Professor
Roger Fairfax explores the development of the harmless error rule, tracing its
origins to larger efforts in the early twentieth century to reform criminal
appellate procedure.13 He outlines the ways in which reformers advocated in
favor of the rule on the grounds that it would make the system more efficient,
effective, and fair, as well as through such rhetorical devices as tying the lack
of a harmless error rule to increasing crime rates and portraying appellate
judges as ―fearful of judging.‖14 He concludes by posing the question whether
the doctrine of harmless error has in application evolved in such a way as to
meet the goals the reformers sought to achieve. 15 Professor Frank Bowman
steps back even farther in time, examining criminal appeals in antebellum
Missouri through detailed study of a series of individual cases. 16 He humbly
disclaims the notion that his consideration of the exploits of lawyers James
Rollins and Odon Guitar allows for the drawing of ―any profound lessons or
deep insights.‖17 Still, the comparison of that criminal justice system to our
own helps to underscore the extent to which the contemporary criminal
appeals system rests on assumptions that are not so inevitable as their
familiarity might lead us to believe. Paul Carrington covers more recent
ground, tracing how current appellate processes have drifted even farther
away from the ideal in the thirty-four years since he, along with Dan Meador
and Maurice Rosenberg, published Justice on Appeal, a classic text that
embodied much of the work of the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice. 18
Focusing on the federal courts, he concludes that much of what takes place in
the guise of criminal litigation is not adjudication but rather ―informal
bargaining in a bureaucratic process.‖19 He forcefully articulates the case for
―transparency and accountability in a process of adjudication of guilt‖ and
against ―practices allowing criminal appeals to be papered over by staff work
so that those appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate give no
more than glancing attention to the question of whether a proceeding resulting

12. The panelists were Justice James Duggan, New Hampshire Supreme Court; Chief Justice
Karla Gray (Ret.), Montana Supreme Court; Judge Arlene Johnson, Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals; Chief Justice Randall Shepard, Indiana Supreme Court; and Judge Diane Sykes, United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (and former Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court).
13. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early Twentieth-Century
Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433 (2009).
14. Id. at 447.
15. Id. at 455–57.
16. Frank O. Bowman, III, Stories of Crimes, Trials, and Appeals in Civil War Era Missouri,
93 MARQ. L. REV. 349 (2009).
17. Id. at 376.
18. Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-Century Perspective,
93 MARQ. L. REV. 459 (2009).
19. Id. at 474.
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in a conviction was properly conducted.‖ 20 We are fortunate as well to have
Professor Michael Klarman’s article on the Scottsboro cases, in which he
explores the role of race and injustice in the Supreme Court’s development of
modern criminal procedure.21
The second panel explored institutional roles. Professor Andrew Hessick
investigates the government’s role as a repeat player in criminal appeals, and
considers the strategies the government might employ in furtherance of its
interest in developing favorable legal rules. 22 These include its ability to
select which arguments to raise in a given case and to choose to bring a series
of cases in a sequence designed to maximize the chances of convincing the
court to adopt a preferred rule. 23 He articulates reasons for concern about this
potential for influence, which include not only the tension between such
influence and separation of powers, but also the seeming unfairness of the
government enjoying this power in addition to the various other ways in
which it enjoys advantages in the criminal process.24 Professor Gerald
Uelmen describes his experience as executive director of the California
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice. 25 He outlines the
dysfunction of California’s death penalty regime, and conveys the frustrations
of seeing the Commission’s recommendations fall to a veto. 26
The third panel concerned the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Professor Stephen Smith contends that a recent line of cases represents a shift
in the Supreme Court’s approach to ineffective assistance claims, one in
which he contends the Court has taken the right to counsel more seriously. 27
Although these recent cases have all involved the imposition of the death
penalty, he contends that their more stringent standards should not be limited
to capital cases, for only then will the results of criminal cases regularly
generate reliable, accurate outcomes. 28 Professor Greg O’Meara analyzes the
application of ineffective assistance law in the circuit courts in the wake of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and concludes that,
despite Congress’s efforts in AEDPA to restrict access to habeas review, the
lower federal courts have required more of defense counsel than the Supreme

20. Id.
21. Michael J. Klarman, Scottsboro, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 379 (2009).
22. Hessick, supra note 6.
23. Id. at 480–90.
24. Id. at 490–93.
25. Gerald F. Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California
Experience, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 495 (2009).
26. Id. at 495–96.
27. Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515 (2009).
28. Id. at 537–42.
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Court’s cases seem to require.29 He suggests two reasons for this trend. The
first is that AEDPA ignores the constitutional underpinnings of habeas
review, and the second is that AEDPA falsely assumes an equivalence
between the binding nature of statutory text and precedential case law. 30
The fourth panel addressed wrongful conviction issues. Professor Keith
Findley poses the question of how well the appellate process serves to protect
against mistaken convictions, and concludes that there is considerable room
for improvement.31 He surveys the recent evidence, much of which has
emerged from DNA testing, revealing that the criminal justice system has not
been error-free even with respect to its handling of the most serious crimes. 32
He contends that there is a greater role for appellate courts to play in
protecting against wrongful convictions, and outlines a number of ways in
which the appellate process might be modified to respond to claims of
innocence. Professor Sandra Guerra Thompson focuses on eyewitness
identification testimony, which is notoriously unreliable and plays a role in a
large portion of wrongful convictions. 33 She examined a year’s worth of
appellate cases involving challenges to eyewitness identification testimony. 34
Her study revealed that courts have continued to sanction the use of such
testimony in circumstances that present misidentification dangers recognized
by researchers, reformers, and various government and private task forces.35
The fifth panel took up the topic of sentencing appeals. The discussion
opens with an article in which Chief Justice Randall Shepard traces the history
of appellate review of sentences in Indiana.36 Amendments to the Indiana
constitution adopted in the late 1960s provided for an appellate review power
that, despite taking some time to mature, has led to a meaningful appellate
role in the sentencing process. Next, Professor John Pfaff investigates state
appellate courts’ implementation of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely
v. Washington37 and United States v. Booker,38 which created a legal

29. Gregory J. O’Meara, S.J., “You Can’t Get There From Here?”: Ineffective Assistance
Claims in Federal Circuit Courts After AEDPA, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 545 (2009).
30. Id. at 557–68.
31. Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591
(2009).
32. Id. at 593–601.
33. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Blindness to Eyewitness Misidentification, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 639 (2009).
34. Id. at 649–57.
35. Id. at 657–68.
36. Randall T. Shepard, Robust Appellate Review of Sentences: Just How British is Indiana?,
93 MARQ. L. REV. 671 (2009).
37. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
38. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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landscape that he characterizes as ―confusing and self-contradictory.‖39 He
considers the effects of Booker on appellate review of sentencing in three
states—Indiana, New Jersey, and Tennessee—that have elected to follow it by
converting their presumptive guidelines to voluntary guidelines.
He
concludes that Booker has had very little effect in those states, and based on
his inquiry outlines some issues with which states must grapple in the process
of determining whether Booker review is normatively desirable.40 Professor
Carissa Byrne Hessick likewise delves into the Supreme Court’s sentencing
jurisprudence, focusing on the impact of the Court’s decision in Kimbrough v.
United States,41 which concerned district courts’ ability to depart from the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the
Guidelines’ treatment of crack cocaine. 42 She identifies a series of problems
and inconsistencies in the resulting regime, and questions the effectiveness of
appellate review in this context. In its place, she proposes that the United
States Sentencing Commission work to persuade district courts that the policy
underpinnings of the Guidelines are appropriate, with the anticipated result
being greater sentencing uniformity as courts opt to impose Guidelines
sentences.43 Professor Michael O’Hear examines the nature of the processes
by which appellate courts engage in review of sentences.44 In particular, he
considers the appropriateness of appellate review directed toward an
assessment of the adequacy of trial courts’ explanations of the sentences they
impose. In the course of making the case for ―explanation review,‖ he
outlines the relevant jurisprudence under federal and Wisconsin law, and
articulates a set of principles by which courts should engage in explanation
review.
The sixth and final panel presented quantitative research. Professors Sara
Benesh and Wendy Martinek address the topic of state court adherence to
Supreme Court precedent. 45 They compare the outputs of state supreme
courts and the federal courts of appeals in cases dealing with criminal
confessions. They find that, while both sets of courts are largely compliant
with Supreme Court precedent, federal courts of appeals appear to be more

39. John F. Pfaff, The Future of Appellate Sentencing Review: Booker in the States, 93 MARQ.
L. REV. 683, 685 (2009).
40. Id. at 712–15.
41. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
42. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough,
93 MARQ. L. REV. 717 (2009).
43. Id. at 741–49.
44. Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning from the
Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751 (2009).
45. Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Marinek, Context and Compliance: A Comparision of State
Supreme Courts and the Circuits, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 795 (2009).
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compliant.46 Professor Michael Heise provides an empirical perspective on
criminal appeals in the federal courts.47 Drawing on data gathered by the
United States Sentencing Commission, he outlines the general contours of the
federal appellate courts’ criminal dockets. He concludes, however, that the
data are insufficient to allow for a meaningful assessment of this work, and
identifies a number of limitations in the data that will have to be addressed to
further develop our understanding of criminal appeals in the federal courts.48
***
We are grateful to all of our authors, other participants, and guests at the
conference for making the event as lively and productive as it was in person,
and for generating such useful contributions to the literature on criminal
appeals. We would also like to thank Dean Joseph Kearney of Marquette
University Law School for his generous support and encouragement, and also
the many members of the law school’s staff and administration for their work
in putting on the conference. Finally, we are grateful to the editorial staff of
the Marquette Law Review for providing a forum for the conference papers
and doing the hard work of bringing them into print.

46. Id. at 814–16.
47. Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 825 (2009).
48. Id. at 838–42.

